We show that healthcare providers face a tradeoff between increasing the number of patients they treat and improving their quality of care, with those providers facing the strongest incentives to treat more patients delivering the lowest quality of care. To measure the magnitude of this quality-quantity tradeoff, we estimate a model of dialysis provision that explicitly incorporates a center's endogenous choice of treatment quality and allows for unobserved differences in productivity across centers. We find that centers may treat 1 percent more patients by allowing their expected infection rate to increase by 0.8 percentage points (6 percent), holding inputs and productivity fixed. Our approach provides unbiased estimates of productivity, whereas traditional methods misattribute lower-quality care to greater productivity. We also find (i) extensive quality-adjusted productivity dispersion across providers, (ii) better outcomes among non-profit entities, and (iii) comparatively little effect from competition.
Introduction
Rising healthcare expenditures have motivated spending reforms such as Medicare's prospective payment system, which ties reimbursements to a fixed amount per service irrespective of a provider's actual costs. While such initiatives aim to limit wasteful healthcare expenses, they may inadvertently result in lower-quality care: providers may face an incentive to reduce the quality of their treatments to minimize costs and increase patient loads. Our paper examines this tradeoff explicitly and provides policymakers with an empirical framework for measuring its magnitude within health care.
A prominent setting where such a tradeoff may be particularly acute and worthy of study is outpatient dialysis treatments, a process that cleans the blood of patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), or kidney failure. Payments to dialysis facilities comprise a substantial portion of Medicare's expenditures each year -over $20 billion in 2011, or 6% of total Medicare spending -and several features of the dialysis industry make it an appealing empirical setting to evaluate healthcare quality. First, payments for treatment are largely uniform due to Medicare's prospective payment system and do not depend on treatment quality, making it possible for us to isolate the effects of quality provision from price discrimination. Second, dialysis treatments follow a straightforward process related to stations and staff, which allows us to approximate a facility's production function. Third, we observe centers' input levels (i.e., staffing and machines) and production (i.e., patient loads), which allows us to cleanly identify the relationship between inputs and outputs. Finally, facilities have observable differences in outcomes that relate directly to the quality of care they provide (e.g., infection and death rates), which allows us to connect a firm's inputs and outputs to its treatment quality, the primary aim of our research.
Determining whether dialysis centers do, in fact, face an incentive to trade off quality for quantity requires overcoming a key empirical challenge: providers' endogenous choices with respect to inputs and quality may bias estimates of the quality-quantity tradeoff. That is, because centers' input choices and targeted levels of quality are not exogenously assigned, estimating the relationship between quality and quantity becomes confounded by unobserved differences in productivity, such as managerial ability or patient characteristics.
1 As higher levels of productivity effectively shift out a center's production possibilities frontier, the center becomes able both to treat more patients and to provide better care; at the extreme, a positive correlation between quality and quantity may result. Even at modest levels of dispersion, this will bias reduced-form estimates of the quality-quantity tradeoff and lead researchers to underestimate the true costs of improving treatment quality.
To uncover the cost of providing higher-quality care in a consistent manner, we build on the structural methods for estimating firm-level production functions first proposed by Olley & Pakes (1996) , and later extended by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) , Ackerberg et al. (2006) , Gandhi et al. (2011) , and others. Conceptually, we adapt these methods to incorporate a "quality-choice" stage that comes after a firm's choices of labor and capital inputs. That is, after acquiring capital and training workers, a manager observes his center's expected level of productivity and chooses the quality of care to provide by, for example, stipulating guidelines for the length of treatment or cleanliness of equipment. Allowing for these endogenous quality choices is an important adaptation for healthcare settings because providers under a prospective payment system may appear more productive by treating many patients ineffectively, whereas policy makers have concerns over both productivity and effectiveness.
Because we do not directly observe firms' actual choices regarding quality, we instead use observable measures of patient outcomes as a proxy for what those choices must have beenif high-quality care is more likely to result in better health outcomes, those outcomes are valid proxies for quality choices. Using multiple measures of health outcomes (in our case, a center's septic infection and mortality rates), we can then implement an instrumental variable approach to recover the impact of quality choices on output.
We use our results to investigate why dialysis centers have such extensive variation in treatment quality, an important policy question for which our empirical approach offers unique insights. While differences in productivity could represent one source of the variation in quality, firms may also choose different quality-quantity combinations deliberately, even when they face the same production possibilities; notably, dialysis centers have an incentive to minimize the costs of treating patients under Medicare's prospective payment system, which may include providing low-quality care. Counteracting this incentive, however, are plausible motivations for providing high-quality treatments: centers must report quality statistics to Medicare which are then made public, and face intermittent inspections by state regulators (Ramanarayanan & Snyder 2011) . In addition, patients have some choice over their dialysis providers, potentially leading centers to compete for patients by providing higher-quality care (Dai 2012) . Finally, non-profit centers may have objectives for providing high-quality care unrelated to maximizing profits (Sloan 2000) .
From our analysis, we find a substantial quality-quantity tradeoff for dialysis treatments:
a center can increase its patient load by 1 percent by allowing a 0.8 percentage point higher septic infection rate, holding input levels and productivity constant; equivalently, holding the number of treated patients constant but allowing a one standard deviation increase in a center's expected infection rate decreases its costs by the equivalent of three full-time employees. In addition, our approach allows us to recover estimates of total factor productivity for each firm that properly account for endogenous quality choices, and we find substantial productivity dispersion across firms that is not explained by differences in treatment quality. Finally, we investigate the determinants of quality in the industry and find that for-profit dialysis centers provide significantly worse care, with an infection rate 1.5 percentage points (roughly 12 percent)
higher than their non-profit counterparts. At the same time, local competition does not appear to lead centers to improve treatment quality. Taken together, these results provide evidence that profit-based incentives to reduce costs for dialysis treatments may lead to lower-quality care and that competition has a limited impact on quality.
In addition to providing relevant policy analysis, this paper also contributes to the growing literature in empirical industrial organization on the estimation of production functions. These methods have a long history in economics, with many well-known econometric issues related to selection and simultaneity bias receiving considerable attention.
2 In light of this, recent work has developed structural techniques that use firms' observed input decisions to control for unobserved productivity shocks and overcome endogeneity problems. 3 We extend these methods to incorporate observable measures of output quality into the production function, which is necessary for healthcare applications. To our knowledge, we are the first to apply these methods to a healthcare setting with the goal of measuring a quality-quantity tradeoff.
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The remainder of our paper continues in the following section with a description of the outpatient dialysis industry and our data sources. Section 3 outlines our methods for estimating a production function in the presence of an endogenous quality choice. Section 4 presents our estimation results. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our findings' implications.
2 See Syverson (2011) for a recent review. 3 See, for example, Olley & Pakes (1996) , Ackerberg et al. (2006) , and Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) . 4 Romley & Goldman (2011) consider quality choices among hospitals using a revealed-preference approach rather than outcome-based quality measures. Lee et al. (2012) use a structural approach to measure the impact of healthcare IT on hospital productivity, but do not consider output quality.
Empirical Setting and Data Description
The demand for dialysis treatments comes from patients afflicted by end-stage renal disease (ESRD), a chronic condition characterized by functional kidney failure that results in death if not treated properly. Patients with ESRD effectively have only two treatment options, a kidney transplant or dialysis. Due to the long wait-list for transplants, however, nearly all ESRD patients at some point must undergo dialysis, a process that cleans the blood of waste and excess fluids. Patients can receive different dialysis modalities, with hemodialysis, a method that circulates a patient's blood through a filtering device before returning it to the body, constituting 90.4 percent of treatments (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services).
Patients receiving dialysis in the United States primarily do so at free-standing dialysis facilities, which collectively comprise over 90 percent of the market (USRDS 2010). (Imerman & Otto 2004 ).
In addition to labor and capital decisions, firms also choose how much effort to put towards providing high-quality care. For example, dialysis sessions require up to one hour of preparation and cleaning, which can be shortened according to a manager's discretion and can directly affect treatment outcomes. Importantly, patients undergoing dialysis face a high risk of septic infection due to the exposure of their blood during treatment, with the risk depending on the cleanliness of the dialysis center. The center likely has considerable control over its targeted infection rate, as health professionals who follow straightforward procedures can effectively minimize their patients' risk of contracting infections (Pronovost et al. 2006) . The decision to do so, however, comes with the tradeoff of treating fewer patients due to the capacity constraints of the facility, which will ultimately reduce the center's profits. of stations and nurses, years in operation, etc.) characteristics. Table 1 presents selected summary statistics from the data, and several variables deserve note. First, Medicare analyzes individual patient records and calculates the number of patientyears each dialysis center treats (e.g., a patient treated at a center for six months is accounted for as one half of a patient-year). We use this variable as our measure of output, as it provides an accurate record of dialysis provision that accounts for partial years of service due to death, transfers, transplants, newly diagnosed patients, and so forth. We also use the number of fulltime equivalent (a weighted mix of full-time and part-time) employees at each center and the number of dialysis stations as our measures of labor and capital inputs, respectively. In terms of 7 We use Hospital Service Areas (HSA) as the market definition for this calculation. capital stock, the average number of dialysis stations used by a center is 18, making the purchase of a new machine a significant investment; reflecting this, firms have zero net investment for 90 percent of the center-year observations in the data. In terms of hiring, centers, on average, increase their staff by the equivalent of one full-time employee each year, while 12.7 percent of centers have no net change in employment in a given year.
We use a center's hospitalization rate from septic (blood) infections as our primary measure of quality, which averages 12.5 percent per year and has a standard deviation of over 6 percent.
In addition to the septic infection rate, we use the ratio of deaths to expected deaths as an alternative measure of quality. 8 Importantly, we can also control for aggregate patient characteristics at each center that influence productivity and quality, which we discuss at length in Section 3.3.
The competitive environment faced by dialysis centers is highly variable, as shown in Table 2 .
Following the healthcare literature, we use hospital service areas (HSA) as our market definition for dialysis centers. While roughly 26 percent of dialysis centers are monopolies within their HSA, the average number of centers in an area is 8.1; in addition, the mean patient-weighted market share across centers within an HSA is 0.457.
Measuring the Quality-Quantity Tradeoff in Dialysis
To measure the relationship between productivity and treatment quality, we propose and estimate a structural model of dialysis provision. In doing so, we account for both the standard 8 The center-level expected death rate is calculated by Medicare using individual patient characteristics. endogeneity problems associated with using observed input choices to estimate production functions and the additional problem introduced by a firm's endogenous choice of treatment quality.
The complication related to endogenous quality decisions stems from the unobserved (to the econometrician) choice made by firms that receive positive shocks to productivity: they may choose either to treat more patients, or to treat current patients more intensively. If highly productive firms elect to provide higher-quality care for their patients, naïve estimates of the quality-quantity tradeoff will be biased, leading us to underestimate the true cost of delivering high-quality care.
To control for this potential source of bias, we extend the work of Olley & Pakes (1996) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) by incorporating firms' endogenous quality targets. Because we only observe noisy measures of quality in our data, however, we also control for measurement error in quality choices, proxied for by firm-level hospitalization rates for septic infection in our application. Specifically, the attenuation bias introduced by measurement error in quality choices would cause us to underestimate the magnitude of the quality-quantity tradeoff, which we correct for using an IV approach.
The Production Technology
We model the provision of dialysis treatments as a two-output production process. Conditional on inputs and productivity, firms face a production possibilities frontier related to the total number of patients they treat and the expected infection rate they target. Formally,
where F (·) is the production function with capital, K it , and labor, L it , inputs, as well as firms' unobserved productivity, ω it . We use the number of stations as our measure of capital and the full-time equivalent number of nurses and technicians as our measure of labor. The unobserved productivity term, ω it , is intended to account for all factors observable to the firm but not to the econometrician that impact the production possibilities; these include unobserved inputs, such as the center's square footage, managerial ability, labor or capital quality, or patient characteristics; this last source of unobserved productivity is particularly important in a healthcare setting such as dialysis where patient sorting may induce large differences in each center's ability to treat patients. For example, highly educated patients may follow treatment protocols more closely and therefore require less attention from technicians while being treated.
The transformation function, T (·), determines how the center's productive capacity is divided between the expected outputs. The first output,Ỹ it , is the expected number of patients treated by the center. The second,q it , represents the expected quality of the treatments, which we model as a scalar index. In general, "quality" can have many dimensions for patients, such as the probability of becoming sick, the amount of time spent waiting for treatments, the convenience of the center's operating hours, or even having televisions available during treatments. Despite this, we focus on one specific dimension of quality, the probability that the patient will contract a septic infection due to treatment. Septic infections occur among dialysis patients because their blood is exposed to the dialysis machine for an extended period of time and multiple patients use the same machine sequentially. Thoroughly cleaning dialysis machines reduces the risk of patients contracting an infection, but is costly because employees must devote time to the process and the machine cannot be used for treatments while being cleaned. Therefore, improving quality (i.e., reducing the firm's expected infection rate) requires the center to treat fewer patients, holding all else fixed. Uncovering this relationship between quantity and quality is the primary goal of our analysis.
We adopt the following parsimonious functional forms to describe the transformation and
We follow the common practice in the literature of assuming a Cobb-Douglass production function, where ω it is a Hicks-neutral technology shifter. For the transformation function, we assume that the production possibilities frontier is such that reducing the infection rate 1 percentage point (i.e., increasingq it by 1) will reduce expected output by a factor of α q . We impose this specification because improving the center's quality (i.e., lowering its expected infection rate) requires treating each patient more intensively and cleaning machines more thoroughly.
This specification allows us to connect a firm's quality target to observable outcomes in a direct manner. By increasing the effort it puts towards quality, the firm incurs additional costs but increases the probability of providing positive treatment outcomes -that is, it may treat fewer patients with the same level of inputs. On the other hand, a change in inputs or productivity shifts the production possibilities frontier, but does not alter the transformation between outputs. A center with healthier patients recognizes that its production frontier has shifted outward, but still faces a tradeoff between treating more patients at a given level of quality and providing higher-quality care for a given number of treatments.
In the data, we do not observe firms' expected output and quality. Instead, we observe realized patient loads and infection rates, which are subject to both measurement error and unanticipated shocks. To account for this, we assume that observed output is Y it =Ỹ it e − y it and the observed infection rate is q it =q it + q . Substituting these into (1), taking the logarithm, and letting lower case letters stand for the logarithm of upper case letters, we arrive at the linear equation,
where α 0 = log A. In (2), the composite error term is ω it + α q it + y it . Two sources of bias are immediately apparent: one due to ω it , and the other due to q it . First, we have the well-known endogeneity problem associated with estimating production functions: because ω it is observed by the firm but not the econometrician, it may be correlated with the firm's capital and labor choices. Our approach adds an additional endogeneity problem, as ω it may also affect the firm's quality target. As a result, OLS estimates of (2) are inconsistent.
Classical methods of correcting for endogeneity involve applying instruments for capital, labor, and quality, or assuming productivity is fixed over time (i.e., ω it = ω i ) and using a fixedeffects estimator (Mundalk 1961) . In application, these approaches have had limited success.
While input prices would seem to be appropriate instruments for capital and labor choices, they often have weak predictive power and can be difficult to obtain. A valid instrument for quality targets that is uncorrelated with unobserved productivity would be even more challenging to find. Furthermore, while the fixed-effects assumption is relatively easy to implement, it is quite strong and would not resolve the endogeneity problems if changes in productivity are responsible for changes in input (or, in our case, quality) choices.
To address these issues, Olley & Pakes (1996) propose an explicit structural approach to estimate the production process which uses observed firm decisions as proxies for unobserved productivity shocks, with the basic ideas behind this method extended further by Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) .
9 In practice, the detailed timing assumptions required for the structural approach must be carefully evaluated to determine whether they fit the industry and data under consideration. As such, we discuss the timing assumptions of our model and relate them to the dialysis industry in the following subsection.
A second source of bias results from the error term, q it . Although this error is unanticipated by the firm, it is, by definition, correlated with our proxy for treatment quality, the observed infection rate q it . This form of classical measurement error will induce attenuation bias, moving our estimate of α q towards zero. We will address this issue by instrumenting for q it with a second proxy for treatment quality, the center's death rate. If the unobservable factors that lead to infections are uncorrelated with those that cause death, than the instrument is valid and we can consistently estimate α q . 
The Timing of Dialysis Center Decision Making
In their seminal paper, Olley & Pakes (1996) use capital investment as a proxy for unobserved productivity under the motivation that firms with greater productivity, all else equal, will make larger investments. Given this intuition, differences in investments will provide a meaningful indication of differences in productivity. While natural for their setting of telecommunications equipment, this approach is not appropriate for dialysis centers because investment in new stations is too infrequent: investment is zero for over 90 percent of the firm-year observations in the data. In light of this, we instead use firms' hiring decisions, which provide a natural proxy in our setting. Nurses and technicians employed by dialysis centers require training and credentialing, which introduce costs and time lags to hiring and layoff decisions. Therefore, we regard labor as a dynamic variable, which allows us to use a firm's (net) hiring decision to 9 A second approach to production function estimation comes from the dynamic panel literature (e.g., Blundell & Bond 2000) ; Ackerberg et al. (2006) provides a comparison of these approaches.
10 It is possible that the unobservable factors related to contracting an infection are correlated with the center's death rate. Note, however, that the unobservable factors from the researcher's perspective are observable to the firm (e.g., a patient with AIDS is both more likely to contract an infection and to die) are accounted for in our model through ωit, and not the unanticipated quality shock, q it , and so would not induce such correlation. Nonetheless, if the unanticipated shocks are correlated, our estimate of αq remains biased towards zero and is best understood as a lower bound. Because we estimate a strong quality-quantity tradeoff, our results are robust to this potential confound.
recover ω it .
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In contrast to labor choices, a firm can quickly adjust the quality of care it provides. For example, to improve quality, a manager could advise his center's staff to take extra precautions when treating patients, or to reduce quality by placing less emphasis on cleanliness and more on speed (Pronovost et al. 2006) . While a center can dictate these policy changes more quickly than it can make can make hiring or investment changes, a lag still exists between a manager's quality decision and its actual implementation.
A firm's manager makes these investment, hiring, and quality choices based on his center's capital stock, labor productivity, and a vector of other observable characteristics, x it . Importantly, the components of x it may affect the firm's policy function even though they do not affect production directly, and may include the extent of competition in the market, the firm's taste for quality via it's non-profit status, and other related variables. This leads to the timing assumptions of our model:
1. In period t − 1, firms observe their productivity, ω i,t−1 , and state, x i,t−1 ; realize output y i,t−1 ; and make investment, i i,t−1 , and hiring, h i,t−1 , decisions.
12 Newly hired workers (and newly invested capital) do not become available until period t, making the transitions for labor and capital:
2. At time t − b, which lies between periods t − 1 and t, the firm discovers its new observable state, x i,t (for example, it observes whether additional firms will enter between periods t−1 and t), and observes its "interim" productivity, ω i,t−b . The firm also chooses its quality target, q i,t . We assume that the choice of a quality target is flexible, and chosen after labor and capital decisions are made. A firm can adjust its quality target, for example, by altering its stated protocols or by instructing managers to emphasize safety.
3. At time t, the firm observes ω i,t , realizes production, y i,t , and makes its hiring and investment decisions, i i,t and h i,t .
In line with the literature, we assume productivity follows an exogenous Markov process 11 Note that this assumption conflicts with OP's conception of labor representing an immediately flexible input, though the distinction fits our setting.
12 Strictly speaking, the investment decision may be made at or before time t − 1.
between periods t − 1, t − b, and t:
where I it represents firm i's information set at time t.
In this setting, unobserved productivity encompasses any factor that allows a center to treat more patients given its observable characteristics and quality target. For instance, a center's patients may follow treatment protocols more closely than other centers' patients do, which then frees the center either (i) to treat more patients because it devotes less time to dealing with complications that arise, or (ii) to spend additional time treating existing patients more intensively, which ultimately improves outcomes but does not appear in raw productivity measures, such as output-to-labor ratios.
Estimation
We use the model to estimate the underlying parameters of the production function and recover each firm's unobserved productivity in every period. We assume that firms behave optimally given the information they have at the time of their decisions, making a firm's hiring decision and quality target a function of its current state. That is, we denote the firm's hiring and quality policies as,
where x it is a state variable of other factors that affect firm policies but do not directly enter the production function.
Estimation proceeds in three steps. First, because we do not observe quality directly, we must find an appropriate proxy for quality based on center-level outcomes. Second, we specify the observed policy shifters, x it , which we include in the firm's hiring function. Finally, we adapt the standard two-stage estimation strategy to incorporate an endogenous quality choice with a noisy proxy.
Proxy for the Quality Target
Although we do not observe treatment quality directly, the data contain information on patient outcomes that are correlated with a center's choices on this dimension. In particular, we focus on the center's infection rate as an indicator of quality. This is only an imperfect measure, however, because variation in the infection rate may be due to differences in patient characteristics across centers rather than differences in centers' quality choices. To account for this, we control for center-level averages of several patient characteristics that influence infection rates. Specifically, we use the (negative) residual from a regression of infection rates on patient characteristics as our proxy for patient quality; this residual represents the variation in infection rates that remains after controlling for observable differences in the patient pool, and therefore serves as a proxy for the center's target for providing high-quality treatments.
We control for several patient characteristics that influence a center's infection rate beyond its quality decision, with summary statistics displayed in Table 3 . Most notably, we include controls for patients' methods of vascular access, which can be either an arteriovenous ( average hemoglobin levels. 13 Putting these center-level average patient characteristics together into the vector x it , we estimate,
where f it is the realized infection rate at center i in period t. The residuals from this regression reflect the center's relative infection rate after controlling for observable patient characteristics, which we then use as our measure of center quality.
Our proxy for a center's quality choice is subject to measurement error, leading to attenuation bias. We have accounted for measurement error in our specification of the production function by including q it . To control for measurement error, we employ a second outcome variable as an instrument for quality targets. Specifically, we use Medicare's estimates for each center's expected death rate which are based on individual patient characteristics (individual-13 Low hemoglobin levels are associated with anemia and pose health risks for dialysis patients. indicator of center quality in its own reports, and we use this measure as a second noisy proxy for a center's quality. Under the assumption that the measurement error components of our two proxies are uncorrelated, the expected death rate is a valid instrument to consistently estimate α q using the infection rate residual as a proxy.
Controlling for Policy Shifters
To invert the hiring function and recover each firm's productivity, we must explicitly control for all factors that affect hiring other than productivity. In our specification, we include the following sources of variation in x.
For-profit Status Centers differ in their ownership type, with roughly 87.7 percent operating as for-profit entities and the remainder as non-profit. A center's ownership structure may affect its polices related to hiring and treatment quality, and we therefore control for this distinction by including a dummy variable for the center's for-profit status in x it .
Competition Because demand for dialysis treatments is local, the extent of competition a center faces may affect its hiring and quality choices. For instance, centers in highly competitive markets may choose to improve quality or increase staff levels to attract patients. We include the level of competition each center faces in x it in the form of dummy variables for having 0, 1, 2, or 3 or more competitors in an HSA. We assume that entry is exogenous and realized at the beginning of the period, so the firm observes its competitors when making its quality and hiring choices.
Two-Step Estimation
Under the assumption that a firm's hiring policy is monotonically increasing in productivity, we can invert the hiring function to recover a firm's productivity as a non-parametric function of observables:
Similarly, firms choose an optimal quality target given their information set at time t − b,
Note that k it and it have been determined already by virtue of the investment and hiring decisions at time t − 1, while we assume that the observable state, x it , is revealed to the centers by the intermediate period t − b. Our timing assumptions imply that the quality policy is not collinear with the hiring policy due to the innovation in productivity between time t − 1 and
15 Moreover, we do not place any invertibility assumptions on q(·).
Substituting (3) into (2), we arrive at our first-stage estimating equation,
where it = α q it + y it and,
Due to invertibility requirements, we only have observations of (5) whenever hiring is non-zero.
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Recall that it is not known to the firm when its hiring, investment, or quality decisions are made. If we had a perfect measure of quality, α q could be consistently estimated from this equation using a kernel-based partially linear estimator (Robinson 1988 ). As discussed above, however, we do not directly observe quality targets, but instead observe only quality-related 14 There do appear to be some adjustment costs to hiring, as centers hire no workers in roughly 18 percent of center-years. We drop these observations since the hiring function will not be invertible in this range, in line with Olley & Pakes (1996) .
15 Ackerberg et al. (2006) emphasize the importance of this point. 16 Because there are likely adjustment costs to hiring, h −1 is not well defined when hiring is zero (multiple productivity levels may lead to zero net hiring). We follow the productivity literature and drop observations of zero hiring when estimating the first stage.
outcomes (e.g., infection rates, hospitalization rates, death rates, etc.). Because we observe multiple noisy measures of quality, we employ one as an instrument to consistently recover α q from a sieve-based estimator using instrumental variables (Chen 2007) . In practice, we use the septic infection residual discussed above as an error-ridden proxy for q it and instrument it with the ratio of expected to actual deaths.
We recover the remaining parameters in a second stage. Note that, given any β = (β k , β ), we can compute an estimate of unobserved productivity for each firm-year that has non-zero
Because ω it follows a Markov process,
where g is a non-parametric function of ω it−1 , and ξ it is a shock to productivity between time t − 1 and t that is independent of the center's time-t information set. 17 Thus, for any given β = (β k , β ), we can estimate g(·) using the estimating equation:
which follows from substituting the production function from (2) into the innovation of productivity from (7), whereα q is the consistent estimator of α q recovered in the first stage. At the true value of β, η(β) = it + ξ it , and so, by construction, η it (β) is uncorrelated with the time-t labor and capital variables. Therefore, β can be consistently estimated using the moment conditions,
We use (8) to estimateβ via GMM, which can then be used to recover firm-level productivity estimates. Finally, standard errors are calculated using the block bootstrap, which accounts for 17 Since we normalize the mean of ωit to zero, the constant term of g is a consistent estimator of α0. 18 We can estimate this equation using each observation that follows a non-zero hiring period. While it might seem more straightforward to recover g(·) by regressingωit(β) onωit−1(β), this would introduce a potential selection problem because we would only be able to use observations where hiring in period t itself was non-zero. We thank David Rivers for pointing this out to us. statistical uncertainty in recovering the quality proxy, as well as both stages of the estimation process.
Results

Production Function Estimates and the Quality-Quantity Tradeoff
In order to compare our structural method to OLS and fixed-effects (FE) procedures, we present the results from estimates of dialysis centers' production functions using each technique in Table 4 . For the results relating to the structural model, we use a fifth-order polynomial with interactions to approximate Φ(·) in the first stage, and a fifth-order polynomial to approximate g(·) in the second stage.
The first three columns in Table 4 present results from specifications that do not include the infection rate as a proxy for quality, with the estimates of β k and β differing substantially across the three estimation methods. A comparison of our structural estimates in Column (III) to OLS in Column (I) and FE in Column (II) highlights several distinguishing features. First, OLS does not control for endogenous input choices, biasing the capital coefficient downwards and the labor coefficient upwards. This bias occurs because OLS relies on cross-sectional variation in stations to identify the labor and capital coefficients while ignoring the possibility of productivity differences across firms.
The FE procedure, in contrast, assumes productivity differences across firms remain constant over time and estimates the capital and labor coefficients on the basis of year-to-year changes in centers' inputs. Using this method, both the capital and labor coefficients fall substantially for two primary reasons. First, relying on only year-to-year variation makes measurement error in both capital and labor inputs a more prominent concern. Because stations and employees remain fairly stable over time, measurement error for hiring and investment decisions biases these coefficients towards zero.
19 A second potential reason for the discrepancy between the OLS and FE approaches is that capital and labor differences in the cross section may proxy for unobserved, time-invariant center characteristics (e.g., center size) that the FE specification captures though the productivity term. That the OLS results suggest centers have a production function with increasing returns to scale best illustrates this distinction, as we would expect that increasing the number of stations and staff within a center of constant size to exhibit decreasing returns to scale.
Finally, the third column presents results from estimates of the model presented in Section 3 with the added restriction that α q = 0. This specification employs a Markov process for productivity and uses both cross-section and time-series variation to identify the parameters, utilizing firms' hiring choices to identify unobserved productivity. These results exhibit decreasing returns to scale with respect to stations and staff, as expected. In addition, they indicate that the impact of additional stations is roughly twice that of increasing the number of staff, which seems natural given the production technology for dialysis procedures. While increasing the number of employees may allow a firm to treat more patients by speeding up the transition of a dialysis station from one patient to another, the number of patients being treated by the center at any given time is necessarily bounded by the number of available stations.
We next turn to the primary focus of the paper, estimating the quality-quantity tradeoff for dialysis centers, α q . The final three columns of Table 4 present results from specifications that control for treatment quality using OLS, FE, and our structural model. All three specifications provide evidence of a statistically significant quantity-quality tradeoff, though the magnitude of the effect is much larger when using the structural model than with either the OLS or FE methods. The coefficient of 0.0124 from the structural model indicates that, holding inputs fixed, a firm that improves its quality enough so that its expected infection rate falls by 1 percentage point would need to reduce overall patient hours by 1.24 percent. Conversely, a center could increase output 1 percent by reducing quality such that its expected infecting rate rose 0.80 percentage points. Alternatively, we can measure the cost of quality in units of labor:
the center could improve its treatment quality by the same amount and maintain its current The smaller impact of quality on output in the OLS and FE specifications likely stems from endogeneity bias. We would expect, and in fact verify below in Table 8 , that providing high-quality treatments is positively associated with productivity. Since the OLS specification does not control for differences in productivity, an estimate of α q in this setup will be biased downward (recall that α q enters the estimating equation (5) with a negative sign). While the FE approach controls for time-invariant productivity levels, if firms' changes in quality targets are positively correlated with changes in their productivity, the FE estimate of α q will also be biased downwards. This effect, coupled with the effects of attenuation bias already discussed above, biases the estimates of the quality-quantity tradeoff towards zero.
In Table 5 , we consider several robustness checks of the baseline results, which are repeated in the first column. The second column drops controls for patient characteristics and instead simply uses the infection rate itself as a proxy for quality targets. The third column drops the center characteristics of for-profit status and competition from the hiring function. Finally, the fourth column does not instrument for the quality proxy but instead simply uses OLS to estimate the first stage. In all cases, the effect of quality declines slightly, though our estimate of a significant quality-quantity tradeoff remains robust to various model specifications.
Productivity Dispersion, Growth, and Persistance
Having estimated the firm-level production function, we are able to recover center-year (log) productivity fromω
this allows us to analyze the dispersion, growth, and persistence of productivity within the dialysis industry. Moreover, we are able to estimate the importance of productivity for firms' quality choices.
To asses the extent of productivity dispersion, we first calculate the proportion of the variance in output explained by the production function outside of productivity differences:
Our results indicate that the amount of productivity dispersion in the dialysis industry is substantial, with R 2 = 0.489, meaning that about half of the variation in output is attributable to productivity differences across firms, not input or quality differences. We can then use these productivity estimates to measure productivity growth and persistence within the dialysis industry, as reported in Table 6 . Overall, average productivity for the industry is roughly constant over the sample, with a slight drop in 2008. Again, we find significant productivity dispersion across the industry: the inter-quartile range indicates that a firm at the 75th percentile of productivity is over 50 percent more productive than one at the 25th percentile.
On average, productivity growth at the firm level is extensive, ranging between 4 and 7 percent per year; at the same time, we observe a large degree of variation in productivity growth within the sample. The contrast of large firm-level productivity growth with slow industry-wide productivity growth suggests that firms enter at a lower level of productivity than incumbents.
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But despite the high average growth rates, substantial dispersion in growth rates across centers still remains, suggesting that year-to-year productivity shocks have a substantial impact on 20 The decline in the number firms in 2008 is due to incomplete reporting of centers' staffing levels rather than actual closures, which are rare in this industry. For the purposes of estimation, we assume these data are missing at random. Notes: Mean level is the average log productivity of all centers active in year t. Mean gain is the average change in log productivity of centers active in years t and t − 1.
centers' output. These shocks could result from high staff turnover, changes in patient characteristics, or other factors that affect productivity. We also find that productivity is persistent within a firm across years, as shown by a correlation in log productivity of approximately 0.8 for the entire sample.
We further explore the trends in productivity across firms in Table 7 . Here, we stratify centers by age, determined by the year in which they first appear in the sample. 21 The average productivity of firms increases substantially with age, while the dispersion in productivity falls with each age group. Note, however, that the increase in productivity from age 0 to 1 is at least partially due to centers only operating for a portion of their initial year, and the results for productivity growth in years 1-3 indicate a fast but declining rate of productivity growth over the initial years of a center's existence. In contrast, the average productivity growth rate of 1.5 percent indicates only modest growth for established firms. Overall, it appears that new firms enter with productivity levels well below the industry average, but then experience strong growth to "catch up" to established firms. This, coupled with the slow growth of established firms themselves, results in relatively stagnant productivity growth for the industry as a whole.
The Determinants of Quality
The quality-quantity tradeoff estimated in Section 4.1 highlights the costs of providing highquality care. In this section, we examine the firm-level characteristics associated with providing better care. In particular, we find that non-profit firms, which may have objectives beyond 21 Centers appearing in 2004 are assumed to be four or more years old. Quality provision within our model is a non-parametric function of all the factors that affect productivity, the for-profit status of the firm, and the extent of competition the firm faces. To summarize the relationship between quality and its determinants, we estimate,
As before, q it is our proxy for quality, which is the deviation in the estimated infection rate from expectations. We use a fifth-order polynomial sieve to approximate the nonparametric function, µ, which contains the variables affecting the firm's production possibilities frontier; to proxy for productivity, we use our productivity estimate recovered from the production function estimation. The parameters of interest are then δ f p(it) , a dummy coefficient for whether the firm is for-profit, and γ c(it) , which is a set of dummy coefficients representing the extent of competition faced by the center in its local market (0, 1, 2, or 3 or more competitors). While this regression suffers from specification and measurement error (both q it andω it are contaminated with measurement error), it remains indicative of centers' quality policies. Again, we compute standard errors using the block bootstrap, which incorporates statistical sampling uncertainty in estimates of quality and productivity, and controls for firm-level serial correlation.
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We present several versions of this quality regression in Table 8 . In Column I, we examine the effect of for-profit status on quality while using non-parametric controls for labor, quality, and productivity. The results show that for-profit firms provide significantly worse care than nonprofit firms, with the expected infection rate more than 1.5 percentage points (over 10 percent) 22 We have also estimated several linear specifications, which yield similar results. higher at for-profits. This estimate is statistically significant and provides strong evidence that firms respond to profit-based incentives by delivering lower-quality treatments. Not only is it costly to provide high-quality care, firms with stronger incentives to control costs appear to respond by delivering lower-quality treatments. Therefore, policymakers aiming to incentivize healthcare providers to reduce costs must fully consider the implications of their initiatives for patient outcomes.
Column II examines the impact of competition on quality, where the base category is centers with three or more competitors in their market (defined as an HSA). The results show no clear pattern between competition and firms' quality choices. Surprisingly, monopolists tend to provide higher -quality treatments than firms in more competitive markets, counter to the intuition that competition for patients provides an incentive to improve quality. On the other hand, duopolists and triopolists offer weakly lower quality than firms with three or more competitors.
Overall, competition does not appear to provide a strong incentive for firms to improve their quality of care.
The results of the first two columns are robust to several other specifications of the quality policy function. In Column III, we include both the for-profit and the competition dummies together. Column IV estimates the for-profit dummy while allowing for nonparametric controls of competition by estimating a separate µ for each competition status. Finally, Column V estimates the competition dummies while controlling for for-profit status non-parametrically. These various specifications confirm our original findings. Controlling for productivity differences, forprofits offer substantially lower-quality treatments than for-profits, and are therefore able to treat more patients using the same amount of resources. By contrast, the extent of competition in a market does not appear to influence the quality-quantity choices of firms in a systematic way.
Because non-profit centers may face less urgency to maximize profits than for-profit centers, for-profit centers likely choose to treat more patients by providing lower-quality care given the substantial quality-quantity tradeoff we have documented for dialysis treatments. And while competition might lead centers to improve their quality of care in order to attract more patients, our results do not provide strong evidence that this is the case. Because demand for dialysis treatments is relatively inelastic -most patients simply choose the center closest to their homes -the limited influence of competitive forces on patient outcomes may not be surprising, though it does suggest that policies aimed at improving the quality of care through fostering greater patient choice in the dialysis industry may be ineffective.
Conclusion
By estimating center-level production functions that incorporate endogenous quality choices, we find evidence that dialysis centers face a tradeoff between treating more patients and providing higher-quality care. Our findings suggest that policies aimed at increasing efficiency may inadvertently affect health outcomes. Although we find considerable dispersion in productivity across firms, these results imply that incentives to reduce costs may lead to lower-quality care, not greater efficiency. Similarly, our results for non-profit centers also provide evidence that firms react to cost incentives by adjusting the quality of their treatments. Non-profit centers, which presumably face less urgency to reduce costs, provide higher-quality care than their for-profit counterparts.
We find little evidence that market forces discipline centers to provide high-quality care.
While competition might be expected to provide a demand-side incentive for improving quality, we find that firms in more-competitive markets are not more likely to offer better care than monopolists. Disentangling the potential explanations for this result lies beyond this paper, though the inelastic demand for dialysis treatments, the dominance of two for-profit chains, and the weak incentives imposed by Medicare all likely contribute to this outcome.
Because dialysis treatments comprise a large -and growing -cost for Medicare, controlling the cost of dialysis provision will likely concern policy makers for the foreseeable future. Our work informs these policy discussions by showing that, while productivity dispersion is extensive within the industry, cost-cutting initiatives may simply reduce the quality of care provided rather than promote efficiency. More importantly, because dialysis resembles other healthcare settings, these findings illustrate the challenges of introducing policies intended to minimize costs while maintaining high standards of care.
